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Hudson v. Commonwealth
590 S.E.2d 362 (Va. 2004)
I. Faas

James Bryant Hudson ("Hudson") was indicted in September 2002 for the
capital and first-degree murders of three individuals.' Hudson pleaded guiltyto
one count of capital murder, one count of first-degree murder, and two counts
of illegal use of a firearm, in exchange for the Commonwealth's agreement to
drop the remaining charges.2 After accepting Hudson's guilty pleas, the trial
court conducted a sentencing hearing.' The Commonwealth presented evidence
supporting its contention that both aggravating factors, vileness and future
dangerousness, existed and that Hudson should receive the death penalty.' In
accordance with Hudson's instructions, the defense counsel presented no
mitigating evidence.' The court found that both aggravating factors existed and
sentenced Hudson to death.6
In May 2003, Hudson waived his right to appeal his sentence of death.7
Despite this waiver, the Supreme Court of Virginia was required to review
Hudson's death sentence undersection 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code.- Pursuant
1. Hudson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E2d 362,363 (Va. 2004); se VA. CODE ANN. S 18.231(7) (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating that "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more
than one person as a part of the same act or transaction" constitutes capital murder); VA. CODE
ANN. S 18.2-32 (Mlichie Supp. 2003) (stating that '[m]urder, other than capital murder. .. by any
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree"). Hudson shot and
killed Stanley Cole, Stanley's brother Wesley, and Wesley's wife PatsyonJuly3, 2002. Hudc, 590
S.El2d at 362-63. Hudson was also indicted on "six counts of unlawfully and feloniously using a
firearm in the commission of a felony" under section 18.2-53 of the Virginia Code. Id (citing VA.
CODE ANN. S 18.2-53 (Mlchie 1996)).
2. Hudon,590 S.E2d at 363.

3. Id
4. Id; seVA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.2 (Michie 2000) (stating that a court may not impose
a death sentence unless the court or jury finds that the defendant "would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman").
5. Hudon,590 S.E.2d at 363-64; seeRoss E. Eisenberg, TheLawps Rde Whn TheDomir
SaesDah, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 55,62 (2001) (discussing the lawyer's obligations when defendants 'ask
for death" by refusing to allow the presentation of mitigating evidence).
6. Hudon, 590 S.E2d at 364. In making its decision, the trial court noted Hudson's
significant criminal record, his lack of any mental or emotional disturbance, his failure to show
remorse, and the viciousness of the crime. Id

7. Id
8. Id; se VA. CODE ANN. 5 17.1-313(A) (Michie 2003) (stating that "[a]
sentence of death
...shaU be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court" (emphasis added)); VA. CODE ANN. 5
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to section 17.1-313, the court considered whether Hudson's sentence was
imposed" 'under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor' and whether the sentence '[was] excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.'"
. Hdd&g
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court did not arbitrarily
impose Hudson's death sentence." In addition, the court determined that
Hudson's death sentence was proportionate to the sentences in similar capital
murder cases." Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Hudson's
sentence of death. 2
IlL A nzbsis/Appliazfo inViT nia
The Supreme Court of Virginia performed its review of Hudson's sentence
in accordance with section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code." The court noted that
a defendant may waive the right to appeal his death sentence, but he may not
waive the statutorily mandated review of section 17.1-313."4 The court stated
that" 'the purpose of the review process is to assure the fair and proper application of the death penalty statutes in this Commonwealth and to instill public
confidence in the administration of justice.' "s The first part of the court's6
review addressed whetherthe trial court imposed Hudson's sentence arbitrarily.'
In support of its finding that the trial court acted properly, the Supreme Court
of Virginia noted "that the trial court, although not mandated to do so, offered
Hudson more than one opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing.""'
The second part of the court's reviewaddressed whether Hudson's sentence
was proportionate "to the penaltyimposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant."' 8 Despite the statute's requirement that the court
17.1-313(Q (requiring the court to consider whether adeath sentence was imposed arbitrarilyand
is proportionate to other similar cases).
9. Huds n,590 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q).
10. Id

11.

Id

12. Idat 365.
13. Id at 364; sw VA. CODE ANN. S17.1-313 (requiring the Supreme Court of Virginia to
review a sentence of death to ensure that the sentence was not imposed arbitrarily and that it is
proportionate to the sentences imposed in similar cases).
14. Huda, 590 S.E.2d at 364.
15. Id (quoting Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Va. 2000)).
16. Id

17.
18.

Id
Id (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(Q).

2004]
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consider "the defendant," the Supreme Court of Virginia never referred to
Hudson as a human being.' The court's proportionality review should have
taken Hudson's personal circumstances into account.2" However, because
Hudson pleaded guilty and refused to present evidence in mitigation, the Supreme Court of Virginia could only compare Hudson's crime to other similar
crimes.2 The lack of mitigation evidence left the court with little basis for
comparing Hudson's personal situation to those of similarlysituated defendants.
While the court's incomplete proportionality review in Huson was understandable, other capital cases involving substantial mitigating evidence have also
received incomplete review.' Proportionality review in cases involving significant mitigating evidence should not read the same as the review in Hwkorn The
Supreme Court of Virginia must consider both the crime arithedefendant as a
human being when performing its proportionality review. 3
In addition, the court stated that it "accumulated the records of all capital
murder cases where a defendant received a death sentence as well as those where
a defendant received a life sentence."24 Despite this assertion, the court failed to
cite any examples of cases considered in its proportionality review that resulted
in a life sentence." In fact, on the same daythat Hudson was handed down, the
Supreme Court of Virginia decided Poudiau Cmr~nath.26 Unlike the Huodsn
19.

See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C) (requiring the court to consider "the defendant").

20.

Id

21.

It is important to note that when a defendant refuses to present mitigating evidence, the

Supreme Court of Virginia is essentially precluded from comparing the defendant to defendants
who received life sentences in similar cases. A verdict resulting a life sentence is most likelybased
on the mitigation evidence presented by that defendant. Thus, if a defendant refuses to present
mitigating evidence, the proportionality review cannot include a comparison to defendants who
received life sentences.
22.
SeeGreen v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E.2d 834,850 (Va. 2003) (comparing Green's crime

to other similar crimes, but neglecting to discuss the defendant's diminished mental capacity
evidence).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(Q.
24. Huson 590 S.E.2d at 364. Because appeals from life sentences do not address sentencing
issues, the record from the Court of Appeals of Virginia is factually inadequate for use by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in its proportionality review. See b#a Part IV.
25. Hdson 590 SE.2d at 364. The Supreme Court of Virginia cited three cases involving
multiple homicides as examples of the cases used in its proportionality review. Id All three cases
resulted in death sentences. Id (citing Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2001); Goins
v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114 (Va. 1996); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394 (Va.
1993)).
26. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537, 563 (Va. 2004) (stating that the Supreme
Court of Virginia's proportionality review "also considered cases in which defendants received life
sentences, rather than the death penalty, for capital murder during the commission of rape or
attempted rape"). In Poud the court cited Home v. Commonwealth, 339 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 1986)
and Keil v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 1981), cases which resulted in life sentences.
Pouza 590 S.E.2d at 563.
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court, the Pone!! court actually cited capital cases that resulted in life sentences in
its proportionality review." Because the court in Hudscn failed to cite any capital
murder cases that resulted in life sentences, it is unclear whether the court
actuallyconsidered any life sentence cases as part of its proportionalityreview."
IV. QKmn
The application of Virginia's death penaltyproportionalityreview system is
flawed. In cases like Hudsor, in which it is unclear whether life sentence cases
were included in the proportionality review, a strong risk exists that the review
performed was a nullity. Even in cases like Poued, in which the court has considered life sentence cases, the compiled records are incomplete as to sentencing
issues9 In order to remedy the random application of death sentences, the
Supreme Court of Virginia must address these weaknesses in its proportionality
review system.
Jessie A. Seiden

27. Poual, 590 S.E.2d at 563. For a more complete discussion of the significance of Poa
swTerrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CA..DEF.J. 591 (2004) (analyzing PoweUv. Commonwealth,

590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004)).

28. One life sentence case that the court might have considered, for example, is the case of
ZacharyCooper. SeeMaria Glod,JwySedes L &Set
in Vt TipleSla~. Ex-MarineKiui WA
DauVtran G5ia inMa, WAS-L POST, Feb. 15,2003, at B1 (Va. ed.) (discussing the case of
ZacharyGCoper, which also involved a capital charge based on three killings bygunshot, but which
instead resulted in a life sentence), at http://www.washingtonpost.com.
29. For a more complete discussion of these issues, seejessie A. Seiden, Case Note, 16 CAP.
DEF. J. 625 (2004) (analyzing Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (D. Neb. 2003)). See
aso Cynthia K. Bruce, PmponditReze Sdll mdap&W, But SdU Naswar 14 CAP. DEF.J. 265,
268 (2002) (discussing how the records from life sentence cases reviewed by the court of appeals
are "not factually developed on the issue of sentencing" and how "the lack of factual information
makes these cases deficient as tools when determining whether similar circumstances exist").

